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Sieve R. Johnson 
The Supreme Court wi ll 
soon hear cha llenges to the 
constitutionality of the indi-
vidual mandate of the hea lthcare reform legis lation. 
It is important tha t this pivota l case be decided on 
the merits. However, it is possible that a closely 
div ided court may hold that the Anti- Injunction Act 
and the Decla ra tory Judg ment Act preclude sub-
s tantive review. 
Johnson urges Congress to e liminate that threat 
by amending the acts so tha t they do no t apply to 
the litiga tion . The amendment s hould be simple, 
q uick, and uncontrovers ia l, w hich would a llow it to 
decisively remove the possibi li ty that resolu tion of 
the national controversy would be d era iled on 
procedura l g rounds. 
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tax notes'' 
The Supreme Court w ill soon cons ider chal-
lenges to Lhe cons litu tiond lity of the so-called indi-
vid uol ma ndate portion of the Patient Pro tection 
c11ld Afford able C He !\ct of 2010 (PPACJ\). 1 It is 
importa nt for the natio n that the Court render n 
decis ion on the n1erits. This could be derai led, 
however, were the Court to di spose of the case by 
holding th<tt the A nti - Injunction Act (J\ IJ\)2 ilnd the 
DeclMato ry Judgment !\ct (DJJ\):l preclude p re-
cnfo rcement review. Dispos ition on those grounds 
wou ld s ubject the federa l governmen t, states, busi-
nesses, and individu ,1 ls to years of ad di tio nal un-
certilinty, inconven ience, and expense. 
Fortunately, tha l threa t to resolution on the mer-
ils ca n be eilsily a nd ex peditious ly removed. This 
report urges Cong ress to ilmend the !\IA and the 
DJ!\ to provide Lhat they do not apply to, o r prevent 
p re-enfo rcem en t judiciill rev iew of, s uits chil ll eng-
ing the cons titu tiona lity o f the ind ividua l mandate. 
T ha l cou ld be done ra pid ly and simply. Because 
bolh s up po rters ci nd opponents of the ind ividur1 1 
milnda te now filvo r on-the-me rits Supreme Court 
review, the re s hou ld be li t tle or no political contro-
versy as to enactment o f Lhe amendments. More-
ove r, Lhe a me ndments wou ld not requi re e labora te 
drafting - two sentences of language (one each for 
the J\ IJ\ a nd the DJ!\) wou ld su ffice. 
Parts I ,ind II of this report provide bnckground. 
Pi1 rt I d escri bes Lhe indi v idua l mandnte, cha llenges 
thilt have been made rl'gilrding the va lid ity of the 
1111indate, and the rl'su lts of litigation to date. Pa rt II 
descri bes the J\ IJ\ a nd DJ!\ a nd recou nts mg uments 
,1dva ncecl ils to the ir .1pplici1bi lily or inapp licability 
to the indi v idual milntfate contex t. 
Pmt Ill ex pla ins the need fo r amendment of the 
J\ IJ\ a nd the DJ!\. It notes tha t there is a genuine 
possibi lity th at the Court 1m 1y hold that the 11cts 
p recl ude prc-t'nforn'ment rev iew o f the cons titu-
tionality of Lhe indi vidua l 1m111d,1tc clnd th,1t this 
oulcome wo uld h;um the country. Disposing of the 
cases on J\ IJ\ cllld DJ!\ grounds wo uld d elay fo r 
yt'il rs on- the-me rits resolution of the lega Ii ty of the 
individua l mandate . That delay would protrnct ou r 
11'. L. 111 - 1-18 (2lllll). T he veh icle by which the Court wi ll 
con~ ider the ch;i lh.:nges is /'/o ridu v. Ot'f1/. of I leuf//J fr /-/111111111 
~.·m, 6-18 F.'.k l 1215 ( 11th Ci r. 20 11 ). Doc 20 11-1 7561 , 2011 TNT 
158-1-1, rt'rl. sr1111ii'd, 80 U.S.L.W. 3 198 ;ind 3199 (Nnv. 1..J , 20 1 !). 
2Sl!clio n 742 1. 
128 U .S.C. ~eel ion 220 1 . 
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agony of uncertainty about what our national 
health policy will be, and it would create great 
practical difficulties for the federal government, 
state governments, businesses, and individuals. 
That is an unacceptable risk given how easily the 
risk could be obviated by short, simple, and uncon-
troversial amendments to the AIA and OJA. 
Part IV addresses how to effect those statutory 
amendments. It considers, and rejects, possible ob-
jections to statutory amendment. 
I. Background 
The wisdom and the legality of the PPACA an.' 
among the most important political and legal issues 
on the contemporary scene. With some exceptions, 
the individual mandate provision of the act requires 
all individuals to obtain "minimum essential [medi-
cal insurance] coverage" for each month.4 Those 
who fail to do so must include with their annual 
federal income tax payment a "shared responsibil-
ity payment." This is denominated as a "penalty" 
by the act.5 The amount of the penalty cannot 
exceed $3,000 for 2014, the first year for which the 
provision will be effective." 
Both supporters and opponents of the PPACA 
recognize the centrality of the individual mandate 
to the act. Congress found that "the requirement is 
an essential part of this larger regulation of eco-
nomic activity."7 Congress believed that without the 
individual mandate, many individuals would wait 
to buy insurance until they needed care, exacerbat-
ing problems in medical care delivery and finance.tl 
Were the individual mandate removed, the viability 
of the entire act would be in question.9 
The individual mandate is highly controversial. 
Critics have assailed it as being beyond the author-
ity of Congress, an unconstitutional assertion of 
power. States, businesses, and individuals have 
initiated numerous suits contesting the provisions' 
validity. The decided cases have not always reached 
the merits, being decided instead on jurisdictional 
or prudential grounds, such as lack of standing or 
lack of ripeness. 10 
'
1PPACA, section 1501, codified at section SOOOA. 
!iSection SOOOA(b ). 
6The details of the individual mandate are described in 
Jeffrey H. Kahn, "The Operation of the Individual Mandate," 
Tax Noles, Aug. 1, 2011, p. 521, Doc 2011-14545, 2011 TNT 148-4. 
742 U.S.C. section 18091(a)(2)(H). 
8 /d. at section 18091 (a)(2)(1) and (F). 
9
"Congress found that the !individual mandate} provision is 
an essential cog in the Affordable Care Act's comprehensive 
scheme to reform the national markets in health care delivery 
and health insurance." Thomas More l.ilw Cmter v. Obama, 651 
F.3d 529, 534 (6th Cir. 2011), Doc 2011-14236, 2011 TNT 126-9. 
10£.g., Virginia v. St'l1L'li11s, 656 F.3d 253 (4th Cir. 2011), Doc 
2011-19032, 2011 TNT 175-13; Baldwi11 v. Sebelius, 654 F.3d 877 
(Footnote continued in next column.) 
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When the courts have reached the merits, they 
have faced an array of arguments against the indi- ft 
vidual mandate and other provisions of the '1) 
PPACA. 11 The two principal battlegrounds are 
whether enactment of the provisions was within the 
authority of Congress under the commerce clause 12 
or under the taxing and spending clauseD of tht> 
Constitution. 
Thus far, four federal circuit courts have issued 
on-the-merits decisions in cases involving chal-
lenges to the individual mandate. On Jum• 29 a 
divided panel of tlw Sixth Circuit in Thomas More 
concluded that the individual mandate cannot bt.• 
sustained under Congress's taxing power but thClt il 
is facially constitutional under the commercc• 
clause. 14 On August 12 a divided panel of tlw 
Eleventh Circuit held that the individual mandate 
cannot be upheld under either the commerce clause 
or the taxing and spending clause.15 On September 
8 a divided panel of the Fourth Circuit held that th<.• 
AIA bars pre-enforcement challenge to the indi-
vidual mandate. 1" On November 8 a divided panel 
(9th Cir. 2011), Doc 2011-17540, 2011 TNT 157-15; Nl'w /mw11 
Pllysicians luc. v. Preside11l of Ille United States, 653 F.3d 234 (3~i 
Cir. 2011); Butler v. Olmma, 2011 WL 4526079 (E.D.N.Y. 2011); 
Pt!lerso11 l1. Unill'd Sia/es, 774 F. Supp.2d 418 (D.N.H. 2011); Kimil'r A 
t>. Gl'itlmer, 2011 WL 1576721 (E.D. Mo. 2011). 'IJI 
11 The less frequent attacks have involved contentions thilt 
the provisions traduce the 10th Amendment; contravene the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act; constitute an unappor-
tioned direct tax on employers; interfere with state sovereignty 
and inhibit the states' performance of their govemmental func-
tions; represent improper commandeering of state resource~ by 
the federal government; and violate the establishment, free 
exercise, equal protection, free speech, and necessary and 
proper clauses of the Constitution. In one "kitchen sink" com-
plaint, the plaintiffs included claims that the PPACA infringes 
on First Amendment freedom of association rights; Fifth 
Amendment due process liberty rights; Ninth Amendment 
privacy rights; and "rights emanating from the First, Third, 
Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments" as to confidentiality of 
medical information. U.S. Citizens Ass'n v. Sel1eli11s, 754 F. Supp. 
2d 903, 905 (N.D. Ohio 2011). 
12U.S. Const., Art. I, section 8, cl. 3. 
nu.s. Const., Art. I, section 8, cl. 1. 
14Tlwmas More, 651 F.3d 529, ~ff g 720 F. Supp.2d 882 (E.D. 
Mich. 2010), Doc 2010-22007, 2010 TNT 196-15. 
ir;Florida v. DcJ''I of Hmltlt [.,.Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235 (11th 
Cir. 2011), Doc 2011-17561, 2011TNT158-14, aff'g in part fr m•'g 
in part 780 F. Supp.2d 1256 (N.D. Fla. 2011), Doc 2011-2175, 2011 
TNT 21-8, c/ar~fied l1y 780 F. Supp.2d 1307 (N.D. Fla. 2011), Doc 
2011-4650, 2011 TNT 44-18 (holding the individual mandate 
unconstitutional). However, the court held that the individual 
mandate is severable such that its invalidity does not requirl' 
invalidating the entire PPACA. 
l<·ut1at11 Univ. /11c. v. Gdtl1m·r, 2011 WL 3962915 (4th Cir. 
2011), Doc.2011-19031, 2011 TNT 175-12, vacating a11d remanding 
753.f. Supp.2d 611 (W.D. Va. 2010), Doc 2010-25502, 2010 TNT • 
231-12 (holding the individual mandate constitutional). On the 
same day, the Fourth Circuit rejt.>cted on standing grounds a suit 
brought by Virginia against the individual mandate. Virginia v. 
(Footnote continued on nexl page.) 
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of the D.C. Circuit held that the AIA does not bar 
pre-enforcement review and that enacting the indi-
vidual mandate was within the power of Congress 
under the commerce clause.17 
The main two reasons the Supreme Court grants 
certiorari - the importance of the case and the 
existence of a split among circuits - both are 
present. 18 Given that, and given that the United 
States as well as other parties have requested re-
view, it was not a surprise that the Supreme Court 
agreed to hear the matter. Oral argument is sched-
uled for March 2012. 
II. Threat to On-the-Merits Decision 
The parties challenging the individual mandate 
typically seek both declaratory and injunctive relief: 
a judicial declaration that the provision is unconsti-
tutional and an injunction against implementation 
and enforcement of the mandate by the federal 
government. The OJA and the AIA imperil the 
ability of the courts to grant that relief. 14 The 
subparts below describe those two statutes and 
summarize the divergent views that have been 
articulated thus far as to their applicability to the 
individual mandate. 
A. Anti-Injunction Act 
The earliest version of the AIA was enacted in 
1857.20 The current version provides, in general, 
that "no suit for the purpose of restraining the 
assessment or collection of any tax shall be main-
tained in any court by any person, whether or not 
such person is the person against whom such tax 
was assessed."21 The act reflects the realization that 
"taxes are the life-blood of government, and their 
prompt and certain availability an imperious 
Sd11'fi11~, 656 F.1d 251, P11cati11g 1111d rcm1111di11s 728 E Supp.2d 768 
(E.D. Va. 2010), Doc 20/0-26522, 20]() TNT 239-8 (holding the 
individual mandate unconstitutional). 
17S1•v1•11-Sk1/ l'. Holder, 2011 WL 5378319 (D.C. Cir. 2011 ), Doc 
2011-23522, 2tJll TNT 217-19. 
18S1•e, 1'.s., Petition for Writ of Certiornri of the United Stntl'S, 
II/IS v. /'lorida, 2010 WL 7634114, at 29-12 (Sept. 28, 2010) 
(describing the circuit split nnd identifying the issue ns "n 
qul•stion of fundamental importance"). 
1
'
1The AJA ilnd the DJA also hm·e loomed large in another 
current tax controversy: rL•medies for thl• IRS's overcharging of 
commtmirntions excise tnxes. S1•1•, l'.g., Colll'll l'. Uuit1•d States, h50 
F3d 717 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (eu '11111c), Doc 2011-14478, 20rl PNT 
128-14; Steve R. Johnson, "Colle11: Hard Cases Makes (Semi) [fad 
Law," 31 ABA S1•ctio11 of '/il.'\:'11 News Q1111rterli1 12 (fall 2011). 
211Another fedeml s·tatute also is called the AIA: 28 U.S.C. 
section 2283. That other statute deals with federal courts enjoin-
ing state court proceedings. That other statute is not the subject 
of this report. for discussion of the other AJA, see Erwin 
Chemerinsky, frdera/ /urisdictivn 735-753 (2007). 
:!'Section 7421(a). 
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need."22 Accordingly, the act's principal purpose is 
"the protection of the Government's need to assess 
and collect taxes as expeditiously as possible with a 
minimum of pre-enforcement judicial interfer-
ence."23 
There are more than a dozen enumerated statu-
tory exceptions to the above prohibition, but none 
of them applies to the situation at hand. Also, there 
are two judicially created exceptions. First, under 
Williams Packing, suit may be brought, notwith-
standing the J\IA, if the plaintiff establishes both 
that under the most liberal view of the law and the 
facts, it is clear the government cannot prevail on 
the merits of the dispute and that the plaintiff faces 
irreparable harm for which no adequate remedy at 
law exists.24 Second, under Soutlz C11roli11a, suit may 
be maintained if Congress has failed to provide an 
allegedly aggrieved party a legal avenue by which 
to contest the legality of the tax in question.25 
As its text makes clear, the AIA precludes courts 
from hearing only those cases that arc brought to 
restrain assessment or collection of a federal "tax."2° 
A central substantive issue in the individual man-
date cases is whether the mandate is proper as a 
"tax" under the taxing and spending clause. At first 
blush one might think that if the challengers prevail 
in their contention that the mandate does not in-
volve a tax under that clause, they necessarily also 
will escape prohibition of their suit under the AIA. 
That is not necessarily so, however, because the 
word "tax" need not have the same meaning for 
constitutional purposes as for statutory purposes. 27 
This fact is illustrated by a pair of cases decided 
on the same day by the Supreme Court. The plain-
tiffs in the two rnses had been subjected to exac-
tions, dt.'nominated as taxes, under a child labor 
22811/I u. U11ili'd Stall's, 295 U.S. 2-17 ( 1935); ~l't' also Edmund 
Burke, Reflcctio11s au I/rt' /~1'vol11liotr i11 Frmrce ("The revenue of the 
st<l te is the sta tc" ). 
21Ho/J /011t's U11iv. l'. Simou, 416 U.S. 725, 736 (1lJ74) (punctua-
tion omitted); ~1'1' 11/so Milla l'. Sla11d11rd N11t Margarine Co., 284 
U.S. 498, 5119 ( ll132). 
:!. 1 E11odr~ l'. William~ f>t1l'ki11g fr Nal'ig11lio11 Co., 370 U.S. 1, 6-7 
(1%2). 
:?r:.So11tlr Carolina u. lfrsmr, -th5 U.S. 367, 373 ( 1984). 
2
''Whether i1 particular exaction should be characterized as a 
tax or as Sllll"lething else matters for, and has been controversiill 
in, mnny contexts, including tax Vl•rsus penalty or other pun-
ishnwnt, t'.g., Watas u. ftlrr, 291 S.W.Jd 873 (Tenn. 2009), Dor 
2009-17530, <"Ind tax versus fee, t'.g., Vl'ltfas Finance I LLC l'. 
Fm11drise 'fo.r Bd., 81 Cal. Rptr. 3d 823 (Cal. App. 2008), cat. 
tlc11ied, 129 S. Ct. 1917 (2004), Doc 2008-17560; Nortlrwest E11ergl'lic 
Sav. LLC u. Fri111dris1• Tirx Bd., 71 Cal. Rptr. 3d 642 (Cal. App. 
2008), Doc 2008-2188. 
27But s1•1• Florida l'. HHS, 716 F. Supp.2d 1120, 1130-1131 (N.D. 
Fla. 2010), Doc 2010-22392, 2010 TNT 199-7 (seeming to suggest 
that the statutory and constitutional definitions of tax ilre 
essentially the same), affd in part and rev'd in J1tlrl, 648 F.3d 1235 
(11th Cir. 2011), Doc 2011-17561, 2011TNT158-14. 
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statute. In one case the plaintiff brought suit to 
restrain assessment of the exaction. The Supreme 
Court held that the exaction was a tax within th«:> 
intendment of the predecessor of the AIA, which 
barred the suit.28 The companion case, however, 
involved a post-payment refund suit, not a pre-
assessment action. Thus, it was not barred by the 
predecessor of the AIA. Reaching the merits, the 
Court held that the exaction was not a tax for 
constitutional purposes and so was invalid.2" 
B. Declaratory Judgment Act 
The AIA may be problematic for tlw injunctive 
relief sought by plaintiffs chalJenging the individuaJ 
mandate. The OJA may b(' problematic for the 
dedaratory relief sought by those plaintiffs. TJu"' 
OJA withdraws authority from fedt.'ral courts to 
grant declaratory relief in tax cases.:111 The courts 
typicalJy hold that the AIA and the OJA arc cocx-
tensive.·11 Accordingly, if the former precludes in-
junctive relief in a given case, the latter precludes 
declaratory relief in the same case. 
As a result, courts usually refer only to the AJA, 
mentioning the OJA only briefly or not at all. The 
remainder of this report will follow that approach 
and will describe the issue whether the two acts 
preclude pre-enforcement review of the constitu-
tionality of the individual mandate as "the AJA 
issue." 
C. Divergent Views on the AIA Issue 
Some of the cases do not address the AJA issue. 
In other cases, however, the Justice Department 
raised the issue.J2 Below are set out some of the 
developments. For the most part, I avoid detailed 
descriptions of the parties' arguments and focus 
instead on the holdings reached. 
A federal district court considered the AIA issue 
in Goudy-Bachman in January. The government 
maintained that the penalty for failing to maintain 
minimum insurance coverage is a tax for AIA 
purposes because the PPACA provides that it is to 
be "assessed and collected in the sanw manner as 
2
"Bail1·y ''· George, 259 U.S. 16 (1922). 
2
'>811ik11 v. Drl'xcl Fumiture Co., 25Y U.S. 2ll (llJ22). The Court 
held that the measure was not a tax, because it was intended not 
to raise revenue but to coerce employers to comply with child 
labor regulations. 
:l028 U.S.C. section 2201(a). The lower federal courts are 
courts of limited jurisdiction. They have only thl' powers and 
jurisdiction that Congress chooses to confer on them. E.g., 
Kokk1m1•11 ''· Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). 
:t•co/w11, 650 F.Jd at 727-731; Sigmo11 Coal Co. v. A1~fl'I, 226 F.3d 
291, 299 (4th Cir. 2000); 111 rt' Lc•ckit· Smokl'less Coal Co., 99 F.3d 573, 
583 (4th Cir. 1996). 
32As seen below, the DOJ has since abandoned the position 
that the AIA bars pre-enforcement review of the constitutional-
ity of the individual mandate. 
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an assessable penalty" under the Internal Revenue 
Code.·1·1 The court rejected this contention, holding 
that "the individual mandate itself is not a tax, nor 
is it intimately connected with the assessment or 
collection of a tax."·1·1 In so doing, the court distin-
guished between a tax, which "is a pecuniary 
burden laid upon individuals or property for tlw 
purpose of supporting the Governmcnt,"15 and a 
penalty, which "connotes a sanction or a punish-
ment for an unlawful act or omission."16 
In Jum"' the Sixth Circuit reached the sanw con-
clusion in Thomas Mon'.17 The court noted that 
Congress had called tlw Pxaction a penalty, not a 
tax.18 ThP court dealt in two ways with tlw fact that 
the penalty was made assessable in the same man-
ner as tax penalties. First, it found "the most natural 
reading of the provision [to be that it] refers to th<.• 
mechanisms the Internal Revenue Service employs 
to enforce penalties, not to the bar against pre-
enforcement challenges to taxes."19 Second, the 
court noted that the same provision denies the USl' 
of some of the IRS's most potent collection tools 
when the individual mandate penalty has not been 
paid:10 Finally, the Sixth Circuit reasoned that tlw 
purpose of the AJA would not be imperiled by 
allowing the challenge to go forward. "Because tlw 
minimum coverage provision does not come into 
effect until 2014 (and the penalty could not bl' 
assessed or collected until at least a year later), this 
lawsuit will hardly interfere with the Government's 
need to assess and collect taxes as expeditiously as 
possible."41 
But the Fourth Circuit took a contrary view in 
September in Liberty U11i11crsity. The district court in 
31Section 5000A(g)(l); s1•c section 667l(a) (dealing with as-
sessment of tax penalties). 
:t·1Go11dy-R11d111um ''· HHS, 764 F. Supp.2d 684, 695 (M.D. Pa. 
2011J, Doc 20"11-1639, 2lH1TNT17-18. 
1
· United Stall's v. Rtwgm1izl'd CFfr/ Fabricalio11s of U/11/i /11c., 
518 U.S. 213, 224 (1996). 
%Goudy-Bae/mum, 764 F. Supp.2d at 695-696 (citing l~cor­
xanized Cf['f'/, 518 U.S. at 224, and U11ill'd Stalt'S v. LnFnmrn, 282 
U.S. 568, 572 (1931)). 
17Tlwmas Mori', 651 F.3d at 539-540. 
18Set' section SOOOA. 
19Tlwm11s Mon·, 651 F.3d at 540. 
41The PPACA provides that the IRS may not attempt to 
collect the individual mandate penalty by placing liens on an 
individual's property or by levying on his property. Nor m.1y 
the IRS bring criminal charges for failure to pay the penalty. 
Section 5000A(g)(2)(B). The only availablt.• collection options art• 
deducting past-due penalties from future tax refunds and 
bringing a collection suit. For a discussion of normal IRS 
collection mechanisms, see David M. Richardson et al., Cil1i/ Tax t 
Proccd11rt', ch. 14 (2008). 
41 Tlmmas Mort', 651 F.Jd at 540. 
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that case had rejected the government's AIA argu-
ment:12 The circuit court reversed. The court rea-
soned that the AIA should be constructed broadly, 
that the "penalty versus tax" distinction is anti-
quated, that the substance of a measure controls 
ovl\r its form and nomenclature in deciding 
whether it is a tax, and that the individual mandate 
enforcement provision has the substance of a tax:0 
A concurrence in Liberty University agreed with 
the opinion of the court on the AIA issue.-1.i A 
dissent disagreed.-t5 The Goudy-Bacl111u111 district 
court reconsidered its earlier position in light of the 
Fourth Circuit's holding, but it reaffirmed its con-
clusion that the AIA does not apply.-'" 
The action is not just in judicial opinions, how-
ever. Briefs and other filings by parties also hi:lve 
been significant. The Fourth Circuit directed the 
plaintiff-appellants and the defcndant-appellce to 
file supplemental briefs on the AIA issue. They did 
so in May. Both Liberty University and the DOJ 
argued against the applicability of the AIA. The 
university contended that the enforcement mecha-
nism does not constitute a tax, that the act does not 
bar constitutional challenges, and that the Willit1111s 
Packing exception applies.-'7 The government main-
tained that the structure and legislative history of 
the relevant statutes reveal the AIA to be nonappli-
cable:18 As noted above, however, the Fourth Circuit 
rejected both the plaintiffs' arguments and the gov-
ernment's arguments. It held that the AIA does 
indeed apply and thus reversed the district court's 
decision. 
Between the time the Liberty University supple-
mentary briefs were filed and the time the Fourth 
Circuit rendered its decision, another important 
event occurred. In July two former IRS commission-
ers, Mortimer Caplin and Sheldon Cohen, filed an 
,1mici curiae brief with the D.C. Circuit, arguing that 
the /\IA and the DJA apply and prevent pre-
'~l.ibaJ_11 lluii 1., 7S.1 F. Supp.2d at 627-629 (concluding th.it the 
individu,11 mandate L'nforcement provision is a regulMory pen-
cilty, not'' tax for purposes of till' AIA). 
111.i/la/t/ U11iu., 21111 WL .1lJh2lJl5, at *4-*14. 
11 /i/. at·· 1n (Wynn, J., nincurring). 
ir.ld. ,1t *2.1-*.15 (D,wis, J., dissL•nting). 
'''(;011d11-H11d1111t111 u. Ill IS, 2011 WL 407287S, .1t *7 n.9 (M.D. 
Pa. 2011),.Doc 2ffll-1%"3, 2011 TNT UW-17. 
17SupplernL•ntal 13ril'f of Appellants, l.ibcrty U11ii'. u. Cl'itl111cr, 
2011 WL 2135094 (4th Cir. May JI, 2llll). In the other Virginia 
GISL', the court found that the other judicial exception, the Smif/1 
Carolina exception, applies, thus displacing the AIA. Vi1sini11, 
702 F. Supp.2d at 604-60S. 
18Supplcmental 13ril'f nf Appl'llees, /.i/1crfy U11il1. i'. Ceitl111er, 
2011 WL 21JS095 (4th Cir. Mav J l, 2011 ). The brid stated: "On 
further reflection, .ind on co1;sideration of the decisions ren-
dered thus far in the [PPACAJ litigation, the United States has 
concluded that the IAIAJ doL•s not foreclosL• the exercise of 
jurisdiction in these cases." Id . .it *2. 
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enforcement judicial review of the individual man-
date. They rejected the penalty versus tax 
distinction, the "constitutional challenges are ex-
empt from the prohibition" contention, and infer-
ences from the structure of the PPACA and the tax 
code. They argued that holding the AIA and the 
OJA inapplicable would undermine effective tax 
administration.-19 
Most recently, a panel of the D.C. Circuit consid-
ered the issue. The majority acknowledged the 
former commissioners' amid brief, but they rea-
soned that Congress did not intend "tax" in the AIA 
to include levies that are labeled as penalties and 
arc unrelated to revenue measures. 50 The lengthy 
dissent, however, saw the AIA as more than an 
inconvenient technicality and concluded that it bars 
pre-l•nforcement review for some of the same struc-
tural, purposive, and precedential reasons as had 
been persuasive to the Liberty University court. 5 ' 
III. Desirability of Amending the Statutes 
Part II set out the numerous conflicting views on 
the AIA issue. The majority of courts have held that 
the /\IA and the OJA do not apply in this context, 
and I agree that this is the better view of the issue. 
Nonetheless, I believe that the /\IA issue should 
be preempted through legislation rather than de-
cided through litigation. Without preemptive legis-
lation, (1) when the Court hears the AIA issue, there 
is a less than 50 percent but still appreciable chance 
that the Court will hold that the /\IA and the DJA 
bar pre-enforcement review of challenges to the 
individual mandate and (2) such a result would be 
unacceptably harmful to the country. This risk 
should not be taken. It can be avoided through easy 
statutory changes. 
A. Possibility the Acts Will Be Held to Apply 
Given the DOJ's current position on the /\IA 
issue, whichever individual mandate case(s) the 
Supreme Court ultimately hears, the two sides will 
dgree on thL' issue. But that will not prevent the 
Suprl\nw Court from considering it and possibly 
holding against both parties on the issul'. 
The AIA issue goes to the subject matter jurisdic-
tion of th<."' fr\dPral courts to hear this question. "'2 
'''Corrected Brief of Amici Curiae Mortimer Caplin ,md 
Sheldon CohL•n in Support of Appellces .ind Affirmance, S1•t•ct1-
Skt/ t1. I/older, 2011WL2847595 (D.C. Cir. 2011) . 
. "
0 S1'l't't1-Skt/, 2011 WL S.178319, at *3. 
"'Id. at *ll-42 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) . 
-..
2£.g., Tlwm11s A-fore, 651 F.3d at 539. Hu/ sec Patrick J. Smith, 
"Is the Anti-lnjuction Act Jurisdictional?" "fox Notes, Nov. 28, 
:Wt I, p. I043, Dor Wl/-22.H9, ur 20l1 TNT 229-7. 
1399 
I 
! 
' I 
• ! 
c I 
r 
r 
111 
., i 
i.I 
Ii 
'j 
'l 
COMMENTARY I SPECIAL REPORT 
Courts have an "independent obligation" to inves-
tigate the limits of their subject matter jurisdiction.51 
That obligation exists even if the parties overlook 
the issue, fail to press it, or agree that jurisdiction 
exists.5-i A court's obligation to examine its subject 
matter jurisdiction operates whenever that jurisdic-
tion is "fairly in doubt,"55 as it is here. 
It is for that reason that the Fourth Circuit 
decided as it did in Liberty University despite the. 
absence of disagreement among the parties regard-
ing the AJA issue, and it is for that reason that the 
Supreme Court allocated an hour of the upcoming 
oral arguments to the AJA issue. 
Most judges who have addressed the issue have 
concluded that the AJA and the DJ A do not pre-
clude pre-enforcement judicial review of the indi-
vidual mandatc.56 I believe that those judges arc 
correct.57 So I hope that were the Supreme Court to 
consider the AIA issue, it would embrace the ma-
jority view. 
That result is hardly a foregone conclusion, how-
ever. The question is close enough that a genuine 
chance exists that a majority of the justices would 
take a view contrary to mine and to that of most 
lower court judges to have addressed the issue. I 
say this for three reasons. 
First, such an outcome is far from unprec-
edented. The Supreme Court has often reached 
results out of keeping with the majority view of the 
lower courts. All of us no doubt can recall examples 
of this. J content myself here with one example. 
For decades it had been controversial whether 
the reach of the federal tax lien is circumscribed by 
state laws rendering tenancy-by-the-entirety inter-
ests exempt from attachment by creditors when 
only one of the spouses is liable on the debt. A 
nearly unbroken line of federal district court and 
r:.:iE.;.:., Arbtms/1 v. YfrH Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006). 
!'1 1£.g., Hc11dm;o11 v. S'1i11seki, 131 S. Ct. 1197, 1202 (2011); Sosna 
z1• Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 398 (1975). But see Helveri11s Z'. Daz1is, 301 
U.S. 619, 639-640 (1937) (accepting an express waiver of the AIA 
by thl• United States). 
"'~Ashcroft v. I11bal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1945 (2009). 
... ll•J>rof. Randy Barnett has been quoted as saying: "I think it's 
highly significant that only two federal judges [the Fourth 
Circuit panel majority in Uhaty Univasity] of all the 13 or so 
federal judges who have looked at it have been persuaded [that 
thl' AIA applies). That suggests it's a problematic argument." 
St•1• Marie Sapiric, "Will the Anti-Injunction Act Apply to the 
Individual Mandate?" 1i1x Noll's, Oct. 3, 2011, p. 17, Doc 2011-
20b85, or 2011TNT190-1. The number of judges in both camps 
has increased since this observation was made. 
"'
7To fully develop the reasons for this belief would be a 
lengthy undertaking and is beyond the scope of this report. If 
the legislative changes proposed by this report are expeditiously 
made, it will be unnecessary for anyone to fully elaborate his 
position on the applicability of the AIA and the DJA in this 
context. 
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circuit court cases going back several generations 
had held that the federal tax lien was so circum-
scribcd.58 Ind<.led, the IRS itself had so ruled several 
times.5'' Opinions on the issue differed within the 
IRS, however, so the IRS continued to litigate it in 
some cases. Eventually, the matter reached th<.' 
Supreme Court. Overturning the long line of Iow<.'r 
court cases, the Supreme Court held that the federal 
tax lien does attach despite state law.60 
Second, the approach of the Supreme Court to 
the AJA has varied over timt•. The Court has some-
times read the scopP of th<.' act's prohibition quilt> 
broadly but at otlwr times has taken a narrowl'f 
view of tlw act's sweep.61 One cannot say with 
certainty which spirit would animate the justicf's 
when they hear challenges to the individua) man-
date. This whole area is highly charged legally, 
politically, and ideologically. Should one or more 
justices wish to find a narrower ground of decision, 
they might latch onto the AIA issue. That could 
affect the outcome of the case given the widely 
shared expectation that the vote of the justices will 
be close. 
Third, views expressed thus far show that the 
question is close.62 Those views include the Fourth 
Circuit's holding in Liberty University, the amici 
brief of two former IRS commissioners, the fact that 
r:.sFor discussion of this issue, see Steve R. Johnson, "After 
Drye: The Likely Attachment of the Federal Tax Lien to the 
Tenancy-by-the-Entireties Interests," 75 Ind. L./. 1163 (2000); 
Stew R. Johnson, "Fog, Fairness, and the federal Fisc: Tenancy-
by-the-Entireties Interests and the Federal Tax Lien," 60 Mo. I .. 
Rt>v. 839 (1998). 
"'
95,.,. LJ11it1•d Statt>:; ''· Craft, 535 U.S. 274, 300 and n.9 (2002), 
Doc 2002-9398, 2002 TNT 75-9 (Thomas, j., dissenting) (citing IRS 
guidance documents on the issue). 
<'°Id. at 282-289 (O'Connor, J., writing for the Court). 
61 For instance, the Court sometimes has emphasized the 
"sweeping krms" of the statute's "literal" language. E.s., A/1•.r-
a11da v. A111nic1111s U11itcd Inc., 416 U.S. 752, 760 (1974). Yet, as 
noted in Part 11.B, s1111m, in Williams f>acki11g and South Caroli1111, 
the Court created judicial exceptions not evident from thl· 
statutl•'s literal language. 
62Scc, 1•.,c.;., Neil S. Siegl'I, quoted in Matthew Dalton and 
Maril• Sapirie, "Supreme Court to Consider AIA's Applicability 
to Healthcare Law," Tax Notes, Nov. 21, p. 935, Doc 2011-23896, 
or 20rl TN'/' 22tJ-1. Let me quantify this in familiar terms. Whl·n 
a tax professional renders an opinion on whether a given 
position should be sustained, the comfort level of thl• opinion 
writer will be expressed in one or another of a set of well-known 
formulations. Se1•, t'.K., Robert P. Rothman, "Tax Opinion Prac-
tice," 64 ·111x um1. 301, 327 (2011) (quantifying tax opinion 
confidence levels). I believe that were the Supreme Court to hear 
the AIA issue, thl• chance that it would hold pre-enforcement 
review to be precluded would meet a "realistic possibility of 
success" standard but not a "more likely than not" standard. In 
other words, I see the chance as over 33 percent but under 50 
percent. Given the stakes described in Part Ill below, a 1-in-3 t 
chance of derailing a decision on the merits is unacceptably 
high. 
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the DOJ originally took a position contrary to its 
current position, and the conviction of the solicitor 
general that the AIA issue has enough substance 
that the Court should ask the parties to brief it.63 
B. Harm if On-the-Merits Decision Is Derailed 
It would be a tragedy if the Court were to use the 
AIA issue to avoid deciding the merits of challenges 
to the individual mandate. It would take many 
years for the constitutional challenges to the 
PPACA to reach the Supreme Court through an 
alternative route, and unacceptable damage would 
be inflicted on the country during the period of that 
delciy. 
1. Delay. If the Supreme Court were to hold that the 
AIA and the OJA bar hearing the merits of the 
constitutional challenges to the PPACA now, when 
next could the Court hear those merits? The merits 
could reach the Court in either of the two ways, but 
both would entail long delay. 
The individual mcindate doesn't go into effect 
until 2014. The returns on which those who do not 
have minimum coverage would have to report the 
penalty would be their 2014 federal income tax 
returns, which would be filed in 2015. One alterna-
tive would be for the individual to pay the penalty 
in 2015 and then file a refund claim with the IRS 
seeking return of the penalty on the ground of its 
constitutional infirmity. Six months later (unless the 
IRS earlier denied the refund claim)/"' the payer 
could file a refund suit in either federal district 
court or the Court of Federal Claims."5 The other 
alternative would be to file a return reporting the 
penalty but omitting payment of it. The individual 
would wait for the government to file a suit to 
collect the unpaid amount,"h and then defend the 
suit on the ground that the provision is unconstitu-
tional. 
Either way, there would be lengthy delay. Noth-
ing could happen until 2014 returns were filed in 
2015. Thereafter, there would be months of return 
processing time followed by years for litigating at 
the trial level, followed by Yl'e:us at the appellate 
"'Bl•causl' till' govl'rnment ,1grees with pl.1intiffs on the AIA 
issUl', thl• fX)j ,1lso suggested that the Supreml• Court consider 
,1ppointing an amicus to file a bril'f taking the rnntrnry position 
on thl• issue . .See Petition for Writ of Certiornri by State of Florida 
et al., Florida v. HHS, 2011 WL 4500702, at JJ-34 and n.7. 
"'.See section 6532(a)(I). 
"r;Scction 7422(a); 28 U.S.C. section 1346; s1•1• Unilt'd .States v. 
Cli11tlmod Elklzom Mining Co., 553 U.S. 1, JO (2008), Doc 2008-
8381, 2008 TNT 74-10 (confirming that the Ali\ does not 
preclude refund suits). 
"".S1•1• sections 5000A(g) and 7403(a). 
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court level, followed by years at the Supreme Court 
level. Realistically, it could be 2020 or later before a 
Supreme Court decision. 
Indeed, by behaving strategically, the govern-
ment could delay a decision even longer, theoreti-
cally forever. Most Americans do not relish the 
thought of tangling with the IRS, so most would 
obtain the minimum coverage. Some of those who 
don't would simply pay the penalty quietly. In 
relative terms, therefore, there might not be that 
many non-payers. Were the numbers small enough, 
the IRS could simply grant their refund claims or 
not refer the cases to the DOJ for prosecution. By 
that expedient, there would be no cases to even-
tually bubble up to the Supreme Court. Thett sce-
nario is unlikely but rnnnot be entirely discounted. 
2. Harms. The longer the validity of the PPACA 
remains unresolved, the greater the harms this 
country will suffer. In urging the Supreme Court to 
hear Florida, a business organization plaintiff in the 
case spoke of the "harmful uncertainty currently 
pcrvad[ing) the Nation" as to this issue and the 
shcired need of both public officials and private 
individuals for a decision that "will eliminate the 
legislative contingency clouding their personal, 
business, and regulatory decisionmaking.""7 Spe-
cifically: 
until this Court decides the extent to which the 
[PPACA] survives, the entire Nation will re-
main mired in doubt, which imposes an enor-
mous drag on our economy. Individuals, 
employees, and States will lack a firm under-
standing of their rights and duties when plan-
ning their affairs. Providers of health 
insurance will have no idea what rules will 
govern their industry. Government officials 
will not know what regulatory measures need 
to be developed. Everyone will needlessly put 
off significant decisions that may be affected 
by the resolution of these contingcncies."8 
Among those "significant decisions" arc hiring 
ck•cisions. It has been suggested that uncertainty 
about employment costs associated with the 
PPACA is a significant factor discouraging busi-
nesses from hiring additional workers."'' 
"
7Petition for Writ of Certiorari of National Fl•tfor,1tion of 
Independent Husiness, National frd. tf i11dt•11mdmt Bus. l'. St'ht'-
li11s, 2011 WL 4479107, at *11 (Sept. 28, 2011 ). 
''xld. at *ll-*12. 
"''The prt•sident of the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta said: 
"Prominent among !the factors impl'ding hiring! is the lack of 
clarity about the cost implications of the recent health care 
legislation. We've frequently heard strong comments to the 
effect of 'my company won't hire a single additional worker 
until we know what health insurance costs are going to be."' 
Dennis P. Lockhart, "Business Feedback on Today's Labor 
(Footnote continued on next page.) 
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The self-interested statements of a litigant are of 
coursl' subject to skepticism. Significantly, however, 
courts havl' reached similar conclusions. As one 
district court observed: 
Responsible individuals, businesses, and states 
will have to start making plans now or very 
shortly to comply with the Act's various man-
dates. Individuals who an• presently insured 
will have to confirm that their current plans 
comply with thl"' Act's requirements and, if not, 
takl' appropriate steps to comply; thl' unin-
sured will need to research available insurancr· 
plans, find one that nwcts their needs, and be-
gin budgeting accordingly; and employers and 
stt-ltes will need to revamp their he<llthcare pro-
grnms to ensure full compliance.7° 
Other courts have exprt"'ssed similar views.71 
Given the stakes, delaying final resolution of the 
legality of the PPACA would be highly disadvanta-
geous. 
IV. Amending the Statutes 
There are three virtues thClt should commend to 
policymakers the statutory amendments suggested 
in this report: amendment would be simple, non-
controversial, and decisive. After developing these 
points, this part considers, and rejects, possible 
objections to the proposa I. 
A. Simple 
Two sentences of legislative language would 
suffice to defuse the AIA issue. One sentence would 
amend section 7421 (the AIA) to provide that it does 
not apply to suits challenging the validity of th<.' 
individual mandate provision of the PPACA. The 
other sentence would correspondingly amend sec-
tion 2201 (the OJA). 
This would be purely ad hoc legislation, so it 
would not have to be reflected in the United States 
Code.72 To take a parallel, the effective date and 
transitional rules portions of session laws typically 
are not codified. 
If fears of unintended consequences rear their 
heads, the sentences could be yet more circum-
Market" (Nov. 11, 2010), 1wt1ilafllc al http:/ /www.frbatlanta.org/ 
news/speeches/lockhart_111110.cfm; St't' also UBS Investment 
Research (Sept. 19, 2011 ), at 1, 1mailablt' at http:/ /www.ubs.com/ 
investmentresearch ("arguably the biggest impediment to hir-
ing (particularly hiring of less skilled workers) is healthcare 
reform"). 
711 U.S. Citi::.t•11s Ass'11, 754 F. Supp.2d at 908. 
71 £ . .i,:., Tlwmas Mew, 720 F. Supp.2d at 882; Virginia, 702 F. 
Supg.2d at 607-608. 
A duly enacted but uncodified session law, of course, is just 
as legally binding as a duly enacted statute codified in the U.S. 
Code. 
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scribed. For exampl<', thl' sentences could be limited 
to protecting only suits brought befon• a specified 6 date or pending in the courts as of a specified date. • 
Selection of the dat<.' would ensure that current 
cases could procl'('d fwe of th<."' AIA and OJA specter 
- which would provide enough vehicles for th<.• 
Supreme Court to decid(' the merits of the indi-
. vidual mandat(' - without concern for what might 
be in complaints not yet written.7~ 
B. Uncontroversial 
There appears to be no political force that would 
opposl' taking tlw AIA and thl' OJA out of the 
individual mandat<.' piclLm'. Tlw DOJ now agrees 
with the shill' <lnd privatl' pl<lintiffs that tlw Su-
preme Court should resolvl' doubts about tlw va-
lidity of the PPACA. And, although it urges tlw 
Supreme Court lo direct briefing of tlw AIA issut"', 
OOJ has changed its view of that issue. 
Assuming that the DOJ reflects the vi('WS of tlw 
administrntion and its congressional allies, both 
sides of the political aisk"' want Suprenw Court 
review lo go forward. That being so, passage of tlw 
amendments should be easy and without contro-
versy. The <lmcndments could be attachl~d as riders 
lo other bills or could be offered as free-standing 
legislation. It would be heartening, in this grid-
locked Congwss, to sc<.' something pass. 
C. Decisive f 
Individual legislators could express their opin-
ions on the AIA issu<.', of course, but that would 
count for little. Post-enactment statements by legis-
lators, even sponsors of the provisions at issue, 
typically arc given littll' or no weight by the 
courts.74 Legislation, however, would resolve the 
question immediately and decisively. 
D. Unobjectionable 
I can think of no substantial objection to the 
amendments proposed in this report. Four possible 
objections aw considered below: effect on tax ad-
ministration, separation of powers, retroactivity, 
and adverse inference. 
1. Tax administration. As noted previously, Caplan 
and Cohen, in their amid brief to the D.C. Circuit, 
argued that the AIA and the OJA should be held to 
apply in the individut-11 mandate context. A contrary 
holding, they feared, would undermine tax admin-
istration. 75 
71Theoretically, such a pro\'ision could be challenged on due 
process ground~. However, the easily satisfied rational basis 
standard of review would apply, and the selective treatment 
would be upheld. 
74 £.g., Bread Political Actio11 Comm. l'. FEC, 455 U.S. 577, 582 f 
n.3 (1982). 
75Corrected Brief, Sllf'rtl n. 49, at *12-•13. 
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Frankly, I doubt that the slope would be as 
slippery as the former commissioners fear. I doubt 
that a holding by the Supreme Court that the AIA 
and the OJA do not apply in the individual mandate 
context would metastasize into license for injunc-
tions against routine tax administration. 
Wherever the truth lies as to that, however, the 
former commissioners' concerns about tax admin-
istration should not be grounds for concern about 
the statutory amendments proposed in this report. 
These amendments would be ad hoc and highly 
targeted. By their terms, they would not apply in 
the general tax context. 
2. Separation of powers. When a legislature at-
tempts to dictate to courts how they are to interpret 
statutes, objections sometimes have been raised that 
the separation of powers principle is traduced.76 
That should not be problematic for the amendments 
proposed here. The amendments would not pur-
port to tell courts how to interpret the AIA or the 
OJA. Instead, they would change the substantive 
content of the laws, which plainly is within the 
purview of Congress. 
3. Retroactivity. There has been some dispute about 
precisely when a law change is retroactive and 
when retroactivity is impcrmissible.77 Amending 
the AIA and the OJA to render them inapplicable to 
suits already commenced would arguably be retro-
active legislation. 
That should not be a problem, however. First, the 
Supreme Court typically has been quite indulgent 
of retroactive tax legislation.78 Second, rctroactivity 
is most problematic when substantial reliance inter-
7
''S1•c, 1•.g., Ez 111us l'. Stall', 872 A.2d 539, 5-12 (Del. 2005) (per 
curiam) (holding unconstitutional such a state statute); Thomas 
A. Bishop, "The Death and Reincarnation of Plain Meaning in 
Connecticut," 41 Cmrn. L. lfrv. 825, 851-857 (2009); Johnson, 
"Statutes Requiring Plain Meaning Interpretation," Sft1/1• "filx 
Noll's, Sept. 14, 2009, p. 763, Doc 2009-19539. 
77For example, in 2010 Treasury amL•nded regulations under 
sections 6501(e) ,md 6229(c)(2) to provide that overstatements of 
basis can be within the six-year limitations period for .1ssess-
ment. Among the objections raised by upponents of that change 
is a claim that the amendment is impermissibly rL•troactive. The 
government maintains that the amendment is not retroactive. 
Sl't' Respondent's l{eply Brief in Support of Respondent's Mo-
tion to Vacate Order and Decision, l1111'rmor111/11i11 /11s11rrmo• Sl'm 
of Vail /LC v. Commissiom•r, No. 25868-06, 2010 WL 6754789, at 
f>t. 111 (May 6, 2010), Doc 2010-10163, 2010 TNT 88-12. ·The 
Supreme Court has agreed to review a related case, so guidance 
on this point may be forthcoming. Home Co11crl'll' fr S111111fy I.LC 
l'. United Staft•s, 634 F.3d 249 (4th Cir. 2011 ), Doc 2011-2674, 20JJ 
TNT 26-7, t"t'r/. granted, 80 U.S.L.W. 3078 (Sept. 27, 2011), Doc 
2011-17772, 2011 TNT 160-13 . 
78£.g., Unikd Stales v. Carf/011, 512 U.S. 26 (1494) (holding that 
a retroactive tax law change did not violate the due process 
clause). 
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ests are at stake,79 which would not be the case here. 
Third, who would object? Both sides want Supreme 
Court review to go forward. Unlike subject matter 
jurisdiction, retroactivity objections are waivable. 
4. Adverse inference. Were the proposed amend-
ments put forward and adopted, they would not 
influence how the acts should be construed in other 
cases; the amendments are targeted to one unique 
area. 
What if the proposed amendments were put 
forward but were not adopted? Would the failure of 
enactment be viewed by the Supreme Court as 
evidence that Congress thinks that the acts do apply 
in the individual mandate context? I doubt it. First, 
the amendments should pass because they arc 
uncontroversial. Second, for statutory interpreta-
tion purposes, the views of the enacting congresses 
(the congresses that passed the acts) are the ones 
that matter, not the views of subsequent congresst..'S, 
which did not participate in the relevant "legislative 
moment."so Third, the courts understand that there 
are numerous reasons particular bills are not en-
acted, so they would not necessarily conclude that 
the failure was because Congress disliked the con-
tents of the bill.81 No adverse inference need be 
drawn. 
V. Con cl us ion 
If the amendments proposed in this report are 
enacted, on-the-merits resolution by the Supreme 
Court of the validity of the individual mandate will 
not be derailed by the AIA issue. If they arc not 
enacted, there is an appreciable chance that the 
Supreme Court will not consider the merits until 
2020 or later. The harms from eight years of delay 
would be great. The risk is not worth taking. 
7
''S1•1• scw·mlly Mitchell Rogovin and Donald L. Korb, "The 
Four R's Revisitl•d: Regulations, Rulings, Reliance, and Retro-
,1ctivity in the 21st Century: !\ View From Within," 46 01111- L. 
l~ev. 323 (2008); Mitd1ell Rogovin, "Tlw Four R's: Rl•gulations, 
l~ulings, Reliance, .ind Retroactivity: !\ View From Within," ·D 
·fo.rl's 756 ( 1%5). 
80E.g., So11//i C11ro/i1111, 465 U.S. at 375; Hob Joni's U11iu., ..J 16 U.S. 
.it 741-742; S1111da i'. Marks, 109 U.S. 184, 191 ( 1883). This 
principle runs counll•r to the reenactment and inaction canons 
of statutory interprl'tation, of course, but those canons <ire quite 
Wl•,1k and usually amount to nwre judicial window dressing. S1•1• 
sc11era/ly Johnson, "The Reenactment and Inaction DoctrinL•s in 
State Tax Litigation," Stall' Tax Noles, Dec. 8, 2008, p. 661, Poe 
2()08-24362. 
81 Inertia, compl•ting time demands, .ind the sense that par-
ticular legislation is unnecessary may explain legislative failure 
.is often as docs substantive disagreement. See, e.g., U11iled Sia/C's 
u. Rodgers, -Joi U.S. h77, 703 n.31 (1983) (attaching no weight to 
failure of enactment of a bill because Congress rejected the 
measure "not necessarily because it disagreed with it, but more 
likely because it found it superfluous"). 
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Congress should <wai l itsel f o f the simpk., unrnn-
trovNsial, and decisive' c:i..p<•dicn t of amending tlw 
Al/\ find tlw DJ/\ to n'ndcr thl'm in<1pplicabk tn the 
current challenges to the \'alid ity of the individm1l 
manda lc.n~ 
In his disst•nl in the most n'ccnl ind ividual 
mandak• circu it cou rt case, Judgr Brett Kitvarlilugh 
a rgued at leng th tha t the /\ I/\ ba rs pre-enforcement 
rcviC'vv. Bu t he addC'd, "Unl<'SS Congrcsc.; crcatt'S an 
cxcc>pt inn for these Affordable Care /\ct casL'S -
wh ich Congrt>ss could s till do nt any atinw - thic.; 
sui t cannot be dccid<'O by the ft'dcral courts until 
2015."1n C'ongn•ss should ncccpt thll l veiled in vi lH-
tion and span• the country pntcntir11ly many yt•ars 
o f harmful uncl' rti'l inty." ' 
·"~Slime ni.iy "~'·:;~ the d1<1nce th.it the Supreme Court will 
rl•,1ch the fc.ued re:.ult to bl' ill il lower lt>vt•I of probabili ty th<1 n 
I do. In my \' il•w, g iven tlw magni tude of the pntvntiu l h,1 rm~, 
till' proposed <1ml'nd111e11t$ would b1· a wi~l' pr,•c,111tion ,11 t'l 'l'll 
il 20 (WrCl'llt or JO pl'rCenl k'\'eJ of p rob:il>ili ty. 
1
"'i1•1w11-:ik1/, 20 11 W L 5:178'.l llJ, ,1t ' l lJ. O f cour:.1•, .1~ 1wtpd 
prL•v111usly, 2il l.5 wnu ld bl' the e.irli,., .. t 11('!-"ibll' ~t.irt of a lak•r 
round or lillg.1tion. II would not Cl>l tcludl' 1111ti l )'l'Olr!> lhl· rc.1 ft e1 
R·1q. Ht!I• )one.' U11 h• .. 416 U.S. <1t 74'i (e111ph.1:. i7i11g thil t 
Cu11g1:l'"-" j.., thl' pr.iper body for crl.,1ting l'\fl'pli1111.., h• till' J\IA). 
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